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Abstract 
The merger in 2009 between China Eastern Airlines and Shanghai Airlines came at a time 
when both airlines were suffering heavy losses, and were struggling for survival during the 
global financial crisis. An examination of the prices on China Eastern’s seven domestic 
Shanghai-based routes suggests that on average fares on departure days have increased by 
22% in the post-merger period. It appears that the 2009 merger conferred China Eastern with 
significant market power owing to the parallel nature of this acquisition, thereby resulting in 
record profit reported in 2010. This reminds regulatory authorities to remain vigilant in 
handling airline mergers when numerous parallel routes are involved. 
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1. Introduction  
China’s airline industry in the past decade has been characterised by a series of merger 
events. In 2002 China’s nine state-owned airlines merged into three airline groups: the Air 
China Group, the China Eastern Group and the China Southern Group. The China Eastern 
Group comprised China Eastern Airlines (hereafter China Eastern), China Yunnan Airlines 
and China Northwest Airlines. In 2009 China Eastern and Shanghai Airlines, two Shanghai-
based competitors, became one under the umbrella of the China Eastern Group. Previous 
studies on airlines mergers have largely focused on the US market. For example, the effects 
of the 1980s mergers that took place in the US airline market have been well studied by 
Borenstein (1990), Werden et al. (1991), Kim and Singal (1993), Morrison (1996), Peters 
(2006), and Kwoka and Shumilkina (2010). In general, market power has been detected 
following the mergers, especially when the merging firms had overlapping routes or if one 
party provided services and the other was a potential entrant.  
The decline in airline company mergers during the 1990s resulted in few empirical studies in 
the US for that period. The price effects of a recent merger between Delta Airlines and 
Northwest Airlines were examined by Luo (2014) whose findings suggest that the merger 
generated only small increases in fares. The author claims that the merger between legacy 
carriers has a weak effect on fares, while changes in low cost carriers (LCCs) have a much 
greater impact on fares. Studies on airline mergers outside the US are rare even though 
numerous mergers have occurred in the last decade. Dobson and Piga (2011) have examined 
the mergers between LCCs in the European market and suggest that efficiency and consumer 
benefits can be realised quickly and so the takeovers have a net beneficial effect for 
consumers, at least in price terms. 
Antitrust policy towards horizontal mergers is largely prospective even in the US. 
Ashenfelter and Hosken (2010) have called for more retrospective studies on the price effects 
of consummated mergers to improve future antitrust decision-making. Studies on mergers are 
particularly important in China because its merger control agency was established as recently 
as 2008 and not only has it had little experience in dealing with airline mergers but it also 
needs empirical evidence to improve the quality of its decision-making.  
The second section of this paper provides the background of the two Shanghai-based airlines, 
and reviews the financial performance of China Eastern before and after the 2009 merger. 
Section 3 presents the data and methodology used in detecting market power that China 
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Eastern may have acquired after merging with Shanghai Airlines. Section 4 discusses the 
findings and their implications. The last section concludes the paper.  
2. Background 
China Eastern was one of six trunk airlines that separated from the Civil Aviation 
Administration of China’s Shanghai Bureau in June 1988. The company’s headquarters is at 
Shanghai Hongqiao International Airport. It was publicly listed in Hong Kong, New York 
and Shanghai in 1997. Shanghai Airlines was established in 1985 by the Shanghai 
Government and was publicly listed in 2002. Also headquartered in Shanghai, Shanghai 
Airlines was a longstanding rival of China Eastern. Their routes to and from Shanghai 
overlapped on almost all of the important domestic and some short-haul international ones. 
The two companies had a tension-filled relationship and price wars between them were 
frequent. Until the late 1990s, China Eastern did not accept tickets issued by Shanghai 
Airlines nor did it take passengers transferred from Shanghai Airlines in times of flight delay 
or cancelation.    
The price effects of China’s 2002 airline mergers were examined by Zhang and Round (2009) 
and Zhang (2012): the 2002 airline consolidation did not confer China Eastern with any 
significant market power in either the short or long term. These studies have found that in the 
years following the mergers, competition in the markets associated with Shanghai remained 
strong because Shanghai is China’s largest commercial city and the routes in and out of 
Shanghai are a significant source of revenue for many domestic airlines. The airline 
companies continually increased flight frequencies and launched new routes to and from this 
city. As a result, price wars broke out regularly. This was one of the reasons for China 
Eastern reporting huge losses—2.8 billion yuan (US$451million) in 2006 and 14 billion yuan 
(US$2.3 billion) in 2008. At the same time, Shanghai Airlines, a profitable carrier for many 
years recorded its first loss in 2007 and the amount lost in 2008 was 1.3 billion yuan (US$210 
million).  
Although China Eastern has been partly privatised, its parent company, China Eastern 
Holdings that represents the state, has absolute control over it by holding about 60% of the 
equity. When China has been transitioning to a market economy from an unresponsive 
planned economy in the last three decades, reforms in the air transport sector were slow and 
limited. China Eastern performed relatively better than other airlines and enjoyed a high 
degree of autonomy before the 2002 consolidation. Its then parent company was in very small 
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scale and did not interfere much in the internal affairs. However, the 2002 consolidation 
created a new parent company for China Eastern, almost 10 times larger than before in terms 
of the number of managers and employees. The new parent company operated in an old-
fashioned style and closely supervised China Eastern’s day-to-day operations, insensitive to 
market changes and macroeconomic variables. Because of the lack of freedom and flexibility, 
China Eastern did not put much effort in developing new markets, improving customer 
services and addressing the needs of employees, which might be the fundamental reason for 
the financial losses. 
The poor performance of China Eastern between 2003 and 2009 clearly indicates that the 
2002 merger did not improve its competitiveness. In fact, most of the empirical studies have 
shown that horizontal mergers on average are not associated with higher profitability (see, for 
example, Jacquemin and Slade 1989). However, many poorly run firms still choose to be 
taken over to avoid bankruptcy, probably because the cost of merging is less than the cost of 
bankruptcy (Shrieves and Stevens 1979). For China Eastern, the merger with another weak 
airline was not ideal, but in the absence of finding a stronger partner, this move at least 
eliminated a close rival, thereby avoiding head-to-head competition on most of the routes in 
and out of Shanghai.  
As a result of the merger, Shanghai Airlines became a wholly-owned subsidiary of China 
Eastern, but retained its brand name. In February 2010, the merger was completed and 
Shanghai Airlines was delisted from the share market. Subsequently, Shanghai Airlines 
withdrew from Star Alliance and joined SkyTeam. The merger gave the new China Eastern 
about 50% of the Shanghai market. At the end of 2010 China Eastern had total assets of 
100.8 billion yuan (US$16.3 billion) with a fleet of 355 aircraft providing services to 182 
destinations. 
China Eastern achieved a record profit before tax of 5.8 billion yuan in 2010 and remained 
profitable in 2011. The merger boosted China Eastern’s passenger and cargo traffic by 47% 
and 55%, respectively, from 2009 to 2010. There was also an impressive improvement in 
both passenger and cargo load factors, the former rising from 72% to around 78% while the 
latter increasing from 50% to 60%.  China Eastern’s annual report credited the increases to 
strong traffic demand due to China’s fast growing economy, the Shanghai World Expo and 
synergies gained through its merger with Shanghai Airlines. For example, the 2009 merger 
enabled China Eastern to optimise its network connectivity with increased capacity at 
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Shanghai’s two airports. New routes were launched, frequencies were increased, schedules 
were coordinated and the right flight time concept was introduced, thereby providing more 
choices for international and domestic passengers.  
Internal reforms were also started in an attempt to restore employees’ confidence and trust in 
the company’s leadership and to increase their sense of participation. Since 2009 China 
Eastern has retired 183 middle- and top-level managers and has created 103 senior 
management job positions for internal candidates.  
Although all these moves may have contributed to China Eastern’s strong performance in 
profit in 2010, it should be acknowledged that most benefits of the merger may take years to 
realise, especially the expected cost savings. Merkert and Morrell (2012) have argued that it 
is only long after the transaction has occurred that some of the uncertainties involved with 
merger activities may become clearer. Therefore, this study hypothesises that the 
fundamental reason for the record profit is the elimination of direct competition which 
allowed China Eastern to charge higher prices. The following sections will use the departure 
day fare data to examine this hypothesis.   
3. Data and methodology  
The fare data were collected from the largest ticketing agency at Shanghai’s two airports. 
More than 80% of the passengers who purchase tickets from their counters fly out on the 
same day according to the ticketing agency’s daily sales reports. Therefore, the fare can be 
regarded as the departure day price. The agency’s monthly statistics report the daily sales 
revenue excluding airport taxes and fuel surcharges, and the number of tickets sold for China 
Eastern.
1
  Thus, the average price for a particular day can be calculated. Business or first 
class fares in the daily sales revenue are removed from the data. Therefore, the final fare data 
represent China Eastern’s one-way daily economy class price (with or without discount). The 
sample used in this study contains prices from 2007 to 2011 on seven domestic routes: 
Shanghai-Changsha, Shanghai-Chongqing, Shanghai-Xi’an, Shanghai-Tianjin, Shanghai-
Shenzhen, Shanghai-Zhengzhou and Shanghai-Chengdu. Shanghai-Shenzhen has long been 
the second most heavily travelled domestic route: 3.8 million passengers were carried on this 
route in 2011. The other six routes are among the top 20 busiest routes from Shanghai to 
other domestic cities in terms of passenger volume. Although more routes could not be 
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 As fuel surcharge is excluded, we do not consider the fuel cost variable in our models. 
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included in this study because of the unavailability of data, the seven routes are important to 
China Eastern and the change in pricing in these markets will shed light on the effect of the 
2009 merger.
 
Table 1 shows a slight increase in the weekly frequency of flights from 2009 to 
2011 on the seven routes. Table 2 reports the annual average fares for each route from 2007 
to 2011. The coefficients of variation that measure price dispersion are also presented in the 
table. Much smaller price dispersions can be observed on almost all of the seven routes in 
2010 and 2011. The low variation in prices may imply that the 2009 acquisition could have 
significantly lessened competition.   
Table 1: Weekly frequency of flights from Shanghai before and after the 2009 merger. 
Shanghai to Flights per week before merger (2009) Flights per week after merger (2011) 
 China Eastern Shanghai Airlines China Eastern 
Changsha 35 7 49 
Chongqing 31 24 60 
Xi’an 66 31 119 
Tianjin 28 21 60 
Shenzhen 56 42 112 
Zhengzhou 35 7 55 
Chengdu 35 21 77 
 
Table 2: Average fare and coefficient of variation (CV) from 2007 to 2011. 
Shanghai to 
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
 
Mean CV Mean CV Mean CV Mean CV Mean CV 
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Changsha 
727 0.23 810 0.16 773 0.15 851 0.13 860 0.10 
Chongqing 
1202 0.26 1005 0.36 1001 0.35 1325 0.21 1313 0.25 
Xi’an 
871 0.32 773 0.38 963 0.34 1170 0.15 1213 0.11 
Tianjin 
881 0.26 859 0.25 896 0.24 1012 0.09 1020 0.07 
Shenzhen 
1035 0.23 1077 0.19 1145 0.23 1332 0.12 1307 0.15 
Zhengzhou 
640 0.21 724 0.16 728 0.17 755 0.16 774 0.10 
Chengdu 
1389 0.20 1178 0.31 1222 0.27 1461 0.18 1412 0.24 
 
Following previous literature such as Morrison and Winston (1995) and Morrison (2001), we 
use a fare equation which can be regarded as a reduced form equation derived from a 
structural model.
2
 The dependent variable is the fare in logarithmic form. The independent 
variables, the geometric means of the population and the gross domestic product for both 
route endpoint cities, are assumed to influence demand in airline literature. These two 
variables are also in logarithmic form and the relevant data can be found in the Chinese City 
Yearbook (2008-2012). The market share of China Eastern on each route has experienced a 
substantial increase since the merger in 2009. Individual airline traffic data are not available, 
so the market share is calculated using the number of seats offered by each airline. This was 
done by checking the Timetable for Chinese Air Carriers (2007-2011) for the frequency of 
each airline and the type of aircraft used for each flight. 
The endogeneity problem has long been recognised as being associated with the regression of 
price on concentration variables such as market share. However, in reality, finding good 
instruments is difficult. Kwoka and Shumilkina (2010) show that any possible endogeneity 
associated with the concentration variable does not greatly affect their results. Gayle and Wu 
(2013) demonstrate that the endogeneity problem associated with market structure is likely to 
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 Readers can refer to Dresner and Tretheway (1992), and Schipper, et al. (2002) for a good discussion of the 
use of structural equations to estimate fares. 
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be small. Brueckner et al. (2013) also argue that bias from the potential endogeneity of the 
competition variables is not a major concern in their study. 
Since the emergence of the hub-and-spoke system following air transport deregulation in the 
US, the price charged by hub airports has been much debated (Borenstein 1989; Lee and 
Luengo-Prado 2005). However, as part of the ‘hub premium’ debate, Tretheway and Kincaid 
(2005) have reported that more recent papers have found the magnitude of the hub dominance 
impact to be very minimal, and other factors such as the presence of LCCs are more 
influential on the higher fares paid at concentrated hubs. In addition, we have included the route 
market share variable, which is closely associated with the airport dominance variable. Therefore, 
the airport dominance variable will not enter into our models. The negative effect of the 
presence of LCCs on fares has been widely reported in the US and the European Union. It is 
believed that a similar effect exists in China’s airline market. Spring Airlines, China’s only 
LCC, operated a fleet of 30 aircraft on more than 40 routes in 2012. This Shanghai-based 
LCC was established in 2005 and has maintained a load factor of about 95% through offering 
low fares, well above the industry average load factor of 70%. It is, therefore, necessary to 
include a low cost carrier dummy in our models that takes the value of 1 when Spring 
Airlines is involved. 
Two dummies are included in our model: Shanghai 2010 Expo and the 2009 merger dummy.  
The Shanghai Expo, which was held from 1 May 2010 to 31 October 2010, attracted many 
tourists. The merger dummy is of interest and takes the value of 1 for the period from January 
2010 when the merger was close to being consummated. Although the merger was announced 
in July 2009, it was understood that it would take time for the two carriers to coordinate 
schedules and to redeploy aircraft. 
The distance variable is included because it captures the transportation cost. It is measured by 
the distance in kilometres between the departure and arrival cities. The logarithmic form is 
used in the model. To control for the seasonal fluctuations, quarterly dummies are also 
included, with the first quarter being the benchmark season. 
In dealing with unbalanced time series cross-sectional data for fares, it is necessary to 
diagnose if heteroskedasticity and serial correlation are present.  A modified Wald statistic 
with chi-squared distribution following Greene (2000) was used to test groupwise 
heteroskedasticity following the use of a fixed effects model. This test revealed a strong 
violation of homoscedasticity for the fare data.  A Wald statistic derived from Woodridge 
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(2002) suggested the existence of first-order serial correlation. Robust standard errors are 
thus reported in the estimation results to accommodate these problems. As the fare data have 
extremely long time periods, a Fisher-type test proposed by Choi (2001) was conducted to 
see if the fare data follow a unit root process.  There has been strong evidence against a unit 
root and in favour of a stationary process for each-cross section unit.   
The fixed and random effects models are commonly used when dealing with panel data. The 
choice between the two models is often guided by a Hausman test. Failure to reject the 
Hausman test implies favouring the random effects on efficiency grounds. However, Clark 
and Linzer (2012) have demonstrated that the Hausman test is neither a necessary nor a 
sufficient metric for deciding between the two models. They argue that the decision should be 
determined by the size of the dataset, the underlying level of correlation between the unit 
effects and regressor. Although the Hausman test conducted in this study prefers a fixed 
effects model, we present the results of both models. An alternative estimation procedure to 
accommodate the heteroskedasticity and serial correlation problems is to use the feasible 
generalised least squares (FGLS) approach (Greene 2000). The FGLS estimation is consistent 
and more efficient than OLS in the presence of the two problems.  In addition, Zellner’s 
(1962) seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) model is used to examine the impact of the 
2009 merger on the fares on each of the seven routes. The fixed effects model is usually 
estimated with large cross-section units and a small number of time periods, while the SUR 
estimator is based on the large-sample properties of small cross-section units and large a 
number of time periods.  
In addition to using a merger dummy in the regression model to detect market power, we also 
calculate the monthly Lerner index proposed by Lerner (1934) for the period 2007-2010 to 
see how much market power China Eastern could exercise before and after the 2009 merger. 
The Lerner index (L) is defined as: 
L= (P-MC)/P                               (1) 
where P is the price charged by the carrier on a given route while MC is the route-specific 
marginal cost.   
Owing to the unavailability of the cost data, we follow the methodology proposed by Brander 
and Zhang (1990, 1993), and subsequently used in Zhang et al. (2013), and Zhang et al. 
(2014) to approximate the route-specific marginal cost: 
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MCkt=cpkt (Dk/AFLt)
-θ
Dk                  (2) 
where Dk is the distance of route k, AFLt  is the average distance flown by the airline, cpkt is 
the cost per passenger-kilometre in period t, and θ is an unknown parameter ranging from 0 
to 1. Zhang et al. (2014) estimate the value of θ using the data from China’s airline industry 
and suggest that θ is around 0.4, a value that is very close to those reported in Oum et al. 
(1993) and Murakami (2011). China Eastern’s annual financial reports can be used to gather 
relevant data to calculate cpkt and AFLt. 
4. Results and discussion  
Tables 3 and 4 present the estimation results from the regression models. Table 3 clearly 
shows that the 2009 merger has conferred China Eastern with significant market power, given 
that on average there was a 22% increase in fares as indicated by all three models. The 
random effects and FGLS approaches suggest that the prices rose by about 8% during the 
Shanghai World Expo period. Not surprisingly, the third quarter experiences higher fares than 
the first quarter as this is the holiday season for students and teachers who usually travel 
around with their families during this time.  The fixed effects model does not show any 
significant effects of other variables when the robust standard errors are reported. The other 
two models reveal a negative relationship between market share and the fares. This is 
consistent with the finding by Evans and Kessides (1993) and Lee and Luengo-Prado (2005), 
who report a weak relationship between route concentration and fares, suggesting that route-
level dominance does not confer much market power to the airlines. Unsurprisingly, long 
distance is associated with higher fares as operating on longer routes is more costly. 
Interestingly, the presence of a LCC, Spring Airlines, does not show an effect of suppressing 
the fares charged by China Eastern in the fixed effects model. The negative effect of the LCC 
reported by the FGLS model is also small in magnitude. This may be explained by the fare 
data used in this research: that is, the departure day prices of China Eastern would not be 
suppressed by the presence of a LCC.   
Table 3: Regression results (dependent variable: departure day fare).  
 Fixed effects Random effects  FGLS 
Coefficient Robust std 
err. 
Coefficient Robust 
std err. 
Coefficient Std err. 
Constant  13.507** 4.579 2.003*** 0.539 1.962*** 0.234 
logPOPmean -0.633 0.465 -0.015 0.025 -0.015 0.012 
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logGDPmean -0.146 0.094 0.222*** 0.060 0.226*** 0.023 
logDistance    0.511*** 0.064 0.511*** 0.015 
China Eastern 
share 
0.002 0.002 -0.007*** 0.001 -0.007*** 0.000 
2010EXPO 0.029 0.034 0.084** 0.034 0.083*** 0.014 
2009merger 0.216*** 0.045 0.229*** 0.052 0.224*** 0.017 
Spring (LCC) 
dummy 
0.050 0.077 -0.036 0.034 -0.035*** 0.010 
Q2 0.0166 0.015 0.028** 0.013 0.030*** 0.011 
Q3 0.081*** 0.008 0.086*** 0.010 0.089*** 0.012 
Q4 0.006 0.018 0.024 0.015 0.028** 0.012 
Observations 11980 11980 11980 
 ***significant at 1%, **significant at 5%, *significant at 10%. 
It can be seen from Table 4 that the 2009 merger has led to an increase in fares by various 
amounts from 7.5% to 43% on all the routes, which might suggest that China Eastern has 
acquired substantial market power. The significance of the quarterly dummies indicates that 
prices significantly vary from one season to another and the summer season is clearly a peak 
season for the airline industry. Similar to the finding in Kwoka and Shumilkina (2010), the 
negative effect of population on fares most likely reflects the effect of larger market size and 
traffic density.   
However, we cannot exclude the possibility that an increase in prices may reflect a 
substantial increase in costs rather than market power. In fact, China Eastern’s annual 
financial reports suggest that the cost per passenger-kilometre rose substantially from 0.60 
yuan in 2008 and 2009 to 0.78 in 2010. It then dropped to 0.64 in 2011. China Eastern 
claimed that it had to incur large costs related to the integration of Shanghai Airlines in 2010. 
As a result, a significant increase in marginal cost in 2010 has been observed on all the seven 
routes in our calculation using Equation (2).   
Table 5 reports the average values of the Lerner indices. It can be seen that the Lerner indices 
are consistently positive on all the seven routes in 2011. For the routes from Shanghai to 
Chongqing, Tianjin, Shenzhen and Chengdu where there is a heavy presence of business 
passengers, the indices are greater than 0 for the whole period from 2007 to 2011. Despite the 
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significant rise in marginal cost in 2010, China Eastern still managed to exercise substantial 
market power on these routes. The fall in marginal cost in 2011 did not lead to a fall in the 
Lerner indices on the four business routes, nor on the other three routes. This may indicate 
that the 2009 merger has strengthened market power because of unilateral or coordinated 
effects. Market power in the markets from Shanghai to Changsha, Xi’an and Zhengzhou was 
relatively weak probably because of the introduction of the high speed rail services 
(Dongchezu) from Shanghai to these cities in the last few years. Despite this, it appears that 
in 2011 China Eastern was able to maintain some degree of market power on these routes. 
Our findings are consistent with Zhang et al. (2014) who examined the market power issue in 
China’s airline markets using completely different data sets. Their Lerner indices for the 
period 2010-2011 are similar to what we have calculated in magnitudes. Both studies have 
confirmed the existence of a certain degree of market power in China’s airline markets. 
In the antitrust analysis of airline consolidation, it is necessary to distinguish between 
complementary and parallel mergers or alliances, as identified by Oum et al. (1996) and Park 
(1997). Park et al. (2001) claim that a complementary alliance enables partners to attract 
more passengers by improving their connecting services and decreasing fares for connecting 
services. New demands are thus created, or are taken from the existing connecting passengers 
of rival airlines. In contrast, parallel alliances were likely to decrease total output and increase 
fares, possibly because of the changed pro-collusive market conditions. The appeal of 
mergers and of airline alliances is much the same for an airline. In fact, Zhang and Zhang 
(2006) note that strategic alliances might be viewed as a lesser form of a merger. Therefore, 
the concepts of complementary and parallel could be applied in merger analysis. Unlike the 
2002 merger where the networks of the merging airlines were largely complementary (Zhang 
2008), the merger between China Eastern and Shanghai Airlines in 2009 was a parallel 
merger, which was the key factor that led to substantial price increase and unprecedented 
profit in 2010.  
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Table 4: SUR results 
 Shanghai-Changsha Shanghai-Chongqing Shanghai-Xi’an Shanghai-Tianjin Shanghai-
Shenzhen 
Shanghai-
Zhengzhou 
Shanghai-Chengdu 
Coefficient Std 
Err. 
Coefficient Std 
Err.. 
Coefficient Std 
Err. 
Coefficient Std 
Err.. 
Coefficient Std 
Err. 
Coefficient Std 
Err. 
Coefficient Std 
Err. 
Constant  53.799** 23.740 125.751** 50.508 94.451*** 33.784 87.106*** 22.424 13.150*** 3.484 9.586*** 3.031 81.034*** 22.874 
logPOP -5.377** 2.661 -11.932** 5.165 -9.616** 3.764 -8.770*** 2.480 -0.959* 0.506 -0.676* 0.348 -7.878*** 2.517 
logGDP 0.333*** 0.118 0.002 0.166 0.201 0.172 0.232 0.132 0.285* 0.151 0.486*** 0.079 0.027 0.155 
China 
Eastern 
share 
-0.005** 0.001 0.005* 0.003 -0.003 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.003* 0.002 -0.001 0.001 0.005* 0.003 
2010EXPO 0.037* 0.021 0.079** 0.034 -0.009 0.031 0.017 0.028 -0.068*** 0.024 -0.006 0.019 0.021 0.030 
2009merger 0.173*** 0.035 0.305*** 0.054 0.427*** 0.045 0.243*** 0.036 0.216*** 0.031 0.075* 0.042 0.202*** 0.048 
Spring 
(LCC) 
0.033 0.026 -0.171*** 0.038 0.157*** 0.053 -0.045 0.042 0.013 0.039     
Q2 0.003 0.016 0.013 0.024 -0.054** 0.022 -0.000 0.019 0.014 0.016 0.050*** 0.015 0.077*** 0.021 
Q3 0.083*** 0.017 0.113*** 0.027 0.075*** 0.023 0.059*** 0.019 0.064*** 0.017 0.100*** 0.017 0.103*** 0.023 
Q4 0.069*** 0.018 0.001 0.028 -0.079*** 0.024 0.002 0.020 -0.017 0.018 0.049*** 0.016 0.027 0.023 
Observations 1519 1519 1519 1519 1519 1519 1519 
***significant at 1%, **significant at 5%, *significant at 10%. 
 
Table 5: Average values of the Lerner Indices 
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 Shanghai-Changsha Shanghai-Chongqing Shanghai-Xi’an Shanghai-Tianjin Shanghai-
Shenzhen 
Shanghai-
Zhengzhou 
Shanghai-Chengdu 
Mean Std 
Dev 
Mean Std 
Dev 
Mean Std 
Dev 
Mean Std 
Dev 
Mean Std 
Dev 
Mean Std 
Dev 
Mean Std 
Dev 
2007 -0.071 0.094 0.186 0.140 -0.342 0.098 0.071 0.059 0.125 0.075 -0.086 0.087 0.213 0.085 
2008 0.117 0.065 0.077 0.181 -0.381 0.249 0.089 0.145 0.226 0.082 0.110 0.096 0.106 0.142 
2009 0.118 0.101 0.145 0.209 -0.107 0.335 0.207 0.109 0.302 0.159 0.169 0.060 0.240 0.093 
2010 -0.066 0.054 0.138 0.077 -0.177 0.068 0.051 0.024 0.205 0.033 -0.037 0.081 0.119 0.052 
2011 0.121 0.018 0.283 0.057 0.059 0.048 0.216 0.014 0.324 0.044 0.127 0.020 0.238 0.109 
 
15 
 
China’s Anti-Monopoly Law was passed in 2007 and became effective from 1 August 2008. 
It is understood that China’s new antitrust enforcement agencies have limited resources and 
little experience in dealing with antitrust cases at this stage. As a result, the merger between 
China Eastern and Shanghai Airlines was not challenged, nor were any conditions such as 
giving up some slots at both Shanghai airports imposed. However, as China’s antitrust 
agencies grow and gain experience, it will be unlikely that China Eastern could duplicate the 
same success story without effectively improving efficiency and reducing costs. The findings 
of this study provide further evidence to antitrust agencies that a consideration of 
complementary and parallel mergers or alliances should be incorporated into their decisions 
on airline consolidation cases.  
It is worth noting that despite the significant increase in prices, the change in social welfare 
after a merger is uncertain when the benefits to the airlines and to consumers are considered, 
especially given that the two airlines were financially unviable before the 2009 merger.  
These days most economists agree that the eventual goal of competition policy should be to 
increase efficiency, i.e., to maximise the sum of consumer surplus and producer surplus. 
Under this goal, the overall benefits including the interests of consumers, producers, resource 
owners, shareholders and other stakeholders will be considered. This might be one possible 
reason why China’s antitrust authorities did not impose any condition on this parallel merger 
in 2009.   
In addition, the merger may increase the merging airlines’ ability to offer greater product 
differentiation, especially for the price-insensitive business passengers, who prefer faster 
connections and place high value on flight punctuality and frequency of service.  Paying a 
higher price does not necessarily represent a loss of consumer welfare for them. We cannot 
exclude the possibility that China Eastern well understands that most late bookers are 
business travellers and the 2009 merger has increased its confidence of charging higher prices 
without worrying about losing customers. However, China Eastern needs to know that this is 
only sustainable if higher quality services are consistently delivered and customers are 
convinced that these services are worthwhile.  
5. Concluding remarks   
Previous studies have suggested that the 2002 airline consolidation did not lead to China 
Eastern charging higher prices, largely due to the complementary nature of this consolidation. 
However, the fundamental reason for the failure of China Eastern before the 2009 merger 
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was probably the bureaucracy of its parent company which operated in a similar way to when 
it was part of a conventional planned economy. This hindered the autonomy of China 
Eastern, resulting in China Eastern being inflexible and insensitive to market changes.    
There have seen some success for China Eastern since its integration with Shanghai Airlines 
in 2009. An examination of the prices on China Eastern’s seven domestic Shanghai-based 
routes suggests that on average fares have increased by 22% in the post-merger period. This 
study has shown that the increased market power of China Eastern might be the main factor 
contributing to its record profit in 2010. However, it should be acknowledged that the long-
term effect of the 2009 merger remains unclear. Much will depend on both China Eastern’s 
reform and modernisation agenda, and when the Shanghai market is fully opened to private 
and LCCs.  
This research study has extended the existing airline merger literature in several ways. First, 
typically when firms begin merger talks at least one firm is financially sound and the merger 
is expected to build a bright future for the firms. However, before beginning their 
negotiations both China Eastern and Shanghai Airlines were financially distressed and relied 
on government subsidies. This special case has not been examined before. 
Second, it is well-known that most airlines use an intertemporal pricing strategy and charge 
higher prices for consumers (usually business travellers) who book close to their flight’s 
departure. The use of departure day prices in this paper complements existing studies that 
usually use average prices. The findings will have important implications to business 
passengers who usually do not book their flights well in advance.    
Third, although in theory an anticompetitive effect is highly possible on parallel routes where 
allied or merged airlines operate, most of the empirical evidence suggests that fares charged 
by allied or merged carriers do not significantly differ from those charged by non-aligned 
carriers on similar routes because the upward impact on fares due to the cooperation effect 
tends to be offset by the downward effect from density economies (Dresner 2011). The 
present research, however, has revealed significant increase in fares following a ‘parallel’ 
merger, which reminds regulatory authorities to remain vigilant in handling airline mergers 
when numerous parallel routes are involved.  Clearly a pre-merger analysis should be 
conducted by the antitrust authorities and stringent conditions could be imposed on the 
merged parties when a proposed merger is likely to result in substantial lessening of or 
significant impediment to effective competition. For example, Shanghai’s Hongqiao and 
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Pudong airports are notoriously congested and it has been extremely difficult for new airlines 
to obtain an ideal time slot.  The regulatory authorities could have required China Eastern and 
Shanghai Airlines to give up some of their slots at the two airports, and released them to the 
private carriers that emerged in the last few years. New route licences could also be issued to 
encourage new operators to compete directly with China Eastern on business routes where 
market power is more likely to exist as suggested by this study.  
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